Reasoning and choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD): implications for improving Bayesian reasoning by Tubau Sala, Elisabet et al.
REVIEW
published: 31 March 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00353
Edited by:
Gorka Navarrete,
Universidad Diego Portales, Chile
Reviewed by:
Sangeet Khemlani,
Naval Research Laboratory, USA
Carlos Santamaria,
Universidad de La Laguna, Spain
*Correspondence:
Elisabet Tubau,
Departament de Psicologia Bàsica,
Facultat de Psicologia, Universitat de
Barcelona, Passeig de la Vall
d’Hebron 171, 08035 Barcelona,
Catalonia, Spain
etubau@ub.edu
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Cognition, a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 13 January 2015
Accepted: 12 March 2015
Published: 31 March 2015
Citation:
Tubau E, Aguilar-Lleyda D and
Johnson ED (2015) Reasoning and
choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma
(MHD): implications for improving
Bayesian reasoning.
Front. Psychol. 6:353.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00353
Reasoning and choice in the Monty
Hall Dilemma (MHD): implications for
improving Bayesian reasoning
Elisabet Tubau1,2*, David Aguilar-Lleyda1,2 and Eric D. Johnson1,2
1 Departament de Psicologia Bàsica, Facultat de Psicologia, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain, 2 Research Institute
for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
The Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD) is a two-step decision problem involving counterintuitive
conditional probabilities. The first choice is made among three equally probable options,
whereas the second choice takes place after the elimination of one of the non-selected
options which does not hide the prize. Differing from most Bayesian problems, statistical
information in the MHD has to be inferred, either by learning outcome probabilities or
by reasoning from the presented sequence of events. This often leads to suboptimal
decisions and erroneous probability judgments. Specifically, decision makers commonly
develop a wrong intuition that final probabilities are equally distributed, together with
a preference for their first choice. Several studies have shown that repeated practice
enhances sensitivity to the different reward probabilities, but does not facilitate correct
Bayesian reasoning. However, modest improvements in probability judgments have
been observed after guided explanations. To explain these dissociations, the present
review focuses on two types of causes producing the observed biases: Emotional-
based choice biases and cognitive limitations in understanding probabilistic information.
Among the latter, we identify a crucial cause for the universal difficulty in overcoming the
equiprobability illusion: Incomplete representation of prior and conditional probabilities.
We conclude that repeated practice and/or high incentives can be effective for
overcoming choice biases, but promoting an adequate partitioning of possibilities seems
to be necessary for overcoming cognitive illusions and improving Bayesian reasoning.
Keywords: Bayesian reasoning, Monty Hall Dilemma, choice biases, cognitive illusions, reflection
Introduction
Bayesian reasoning has primarily been investigated in the context of imaginary scenarios, in which
participants are required to derive a posterior probability (or a posterior ratio of natural fre-
quencies) from explicit statistical information. An exception can be found in research with the
Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD), where Bayesian reasoning has been studied with both imaginary
scenarios and repeated practice. Diﬀering from typical Bayesian problems, priors and conditional
probabilities in the MHD have to be inferred, either by learning reward probabilities or by reason-
ing from the presented sequence of events. By reviewing the main diﬃculties and interventions
for improving either choice or probabilistic judgments in the MHD, two diﬀerent causes of fail-
ures are introduced: (1) emotional-based choice biases (switch aversion and/or the endowment
eﬀect), and (2) cognitive limitations in understanding and representing probabilities. We argue
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the MHD with the host (top)
and player (bottom). (1) A player is presented three doors, each with an
equal chance (1/3) of containing a prize and he chooses one of them. (2)
Following the initial selection, the player now has one door with a 1/3
chance of having the prize. The host now has two doors with a total 2/3
chance of having the prize (1/3 + 1/3). (3) The host opens one of his two
doors which does not contain the prize. The player is offered the choice to
stick with his original selection or to switch to the unopened door held by
the host. (4a) Correct Reasoning: Given that the opening of a non-rewarding
door is obligatory, there still remains a 2/3 chance that the prize is on the
“side” of the host, and a 1/3 chance that the prize is behind the player’s
originally chosen door. (4b) Incorrect Reasoning: A typical cognitive error is
based on the illusion of equiprobability between the two remaining doors
(see further explanation in the text).
that while the ﬁrst cause produces illusions of control, regret, or
distortions in the memory of past choice-outcome events, the
second one promotes illusions of equiprobability and/or distor-
tions in understanding the conditions of the game. The present
review shows that both causes can independently and simulta-
neously bias choice and probabilistic judgments. Furthermore,
whereas choice biases can be overcome by extended practice
or by high incentives, overcoming the erroneous default intu-
ition requires explicit instruction about the correct partitioning
of probabilities. Implications for improving Bayesian reasoning
are also discussed.
Understanding the MHD: From
Intuition to Bayesian Reasoning
The MHD is a good example of a counterintuitive decision-
making problem, considered to be “the most expressive example
of cognitive illusions or mental tunnels in which even the ﬁnest
and best-trained minds get trapped” (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994;
p. 161; cited by Krauss and Wang, 2003). In a ﬁrst choice, a
participant selects one of three possible options (i.e., doors),
after being informed that only one hides a prize, and that the
chances for each door are equal. Next, the host (or computer,
in computer-based versions), who knows which door hides the
prize, opens one non-rewarded door of the two remaining non-
selected doors. The participant is then given a second, binary
choice, which determines the ﬁnal outcome of the game: They
may either (a) stay with their initial selection [stick], or (b) swap
their original selection for the other still closed door [switch].
The naïve reader would likely believe that each of the remain-
ing two options has an equal probability of containing the prize,
as often observed in the literature (i.e., Shimojo and Ichikawa,
1989; Franco-Watkins et al., 2003; Tubau and Alonso, 2003; De
Neys and Verschueren, 2006; see also Figure 1). This common
illusion has been attributed to a misapplication of the equiprob-
ability principle (Falk, 1992; Johnson-Laird et al., 1999; Falk and
Lann, 2008) due to the wrong intuition that, after the elimina-
tion of an option, all the chances have to be updated (Baratgin
and Politzer, 2010). Speciﬁcally, the observation of two remaining
options promotes the illusion that each of the ﬁnal two options
has a 50% chance of containing the prize. However, the elimina-
tion of an option (known by the host not to contain the prize)
does not change the prior probability concerning the ﬁrst choice.
As shown in Figure 1 and Table 1, the participant still has a 1/3
chance of having initially selected the prize and, therefore, in two
out of three cases a decision to switch options will ultimately lead
to a prize (a more formal explanation of probabilities in the MHD
is introduced below).
Nevertheless, the ﬁnal choice is generally neither fully coher-
ent with the actual distribution of chances, nor with the mis-
application of the equiprobability principle. A large majority of
participants prefer to stick with the original choice (Granberg
and Brown, 1995; Krauss and Wang, 2003), a tendency that has
been related to an illusion of control (Lichtenstein and Slovic,
1971; Langer, 1975; Granberg and Dorr, 1998), or to a strat-
egy to prevent future regret, which is more strongly perceived
when losing after switching (Gilovich et al., 1995; Granberg and
Brown, 1995; Petrocelli and Harris, 2011). Hence, the MHD
motivates two diﬀerent biases that work against the optimal solu-
tion: The equiprobability illusion and emotional-based choice
biases. Both types of bias are diﬃcult to overcome because
the MHD presents an additional diﬃculty for most people:
The need to distinguish a winning probability that has to be
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TABLE 1 | Possibilities in the MHD: the probability of each door to be opened is conditioned on both the first choice and on the location of the prize.
Prize
location
First
choice
Probability to
open door
Remaining door
(after open)
Best
choice
Door 1 Door 1
Door 2
Door 3
P(each door) = 0.5
P(Door 3) = 1
P(Door 2) = 1
Door 2 or Door 3
Door 1
Door 1
Stick
Switch
Switch
Door 2 Door 1
Door 2
Door 3
P(Door 3) = 1
P(each door) = 0.5
P(Door 1) = 1
Door 2
Door 1 or Door 3
Door 2
Switch
Stick
Switch
Door 3 Door 1
Door 2
Door 3
P(Door 2) = 1
P(Door 1) = 1
P(each door) = 0.5
Door 3
Door 3
Door 1 or Door 2
Switch
Switch
Stick
Notice that in 1 of 3 times the prize is behind the selected door and in 2 of 3 times the prize is behind the remaining door. Therefore, P(prize| stick) = 1/3 and P(prize|
switch = 2/3 (in bold, location of the ace after opening one door).
updated (the one concerning the remaining door) from a win-
ning probability that remains the same (the one concerning the
ﬁrst choice). Regarding this point, we claim that diﬃculties in
overcoming illusions in the MHD are a consequence of a more
primary cause: A biased representation of the prior probabilities.
In Section “An Overlooked Failure: Incomplete Representation
of Prior Probabilities” we review evidence supporting this
claim.
From a Bayesian perspective, understanding the optimal solu-
tion in the MHD requires realizing that the elimination event
is conditioned on both the ﬁrst choice and on the location of
the prize (Glymour, 2001; Burns and Wieth, 2004). Consider
a scenario where the participant initially selects door 1. The
conditional probability (likelihood) of eliminating, for exam-
ple, door 3 after choosing door 1, depends on the hypothesis
being considered (see also Falk and Lann, 2008). Speciﬁcally,
given that the probability of revealing door 3 among the remain-
ing two doors does not depend on the content of selected
door 1 [P(D3| H1) = P(D3) = 1/2], the posterior probability
of such door containing the prize, conditioned to the elimina-
tion of door 3, is the same as its prior probability of contain-
ing the prize [P(H1| D3) = P(H1) = 1/3]. In contrast, given
that the probability of revealing door 3, conditioned to the
prize being hidden in the remaining door 2, is doubled [P(D3|
H2)= 2P(D3)= 1], the posterior probability of door 2 hiding the
prize, conditioned to the opening of door 3, also doubles [P(H2|
D3)= 2P(H2)= 2/3].
In other words, the conditions of the elimination have two
main implications: (a) the winning probability for the selected
door cannot change since it is conditioned to an uncondi-
tional event (it is certain that one of the non-selected doors is
always null), and (b) the winning probability for the remain-
ing door doubles, as the opening of a non-selected door is
conditioned on the current location of the prize (see Table 1).
In sum, understanding the MHD requires being able to dis-
tinguish conditional and unconditional events, or conditions
in which probabilities have to be updated from conditions
in which probabilities remain the same. In the following sec-
tions we review the diﬃculties found both in learning to
choose optimally and in correct (explicit) Bayesian reason-
ing in the MHD in order to suggest causes and possible
remediation.
Learning to Choose Optimally in the
MHD
It is a well-grounded ﬁnding that both humans and non-human
animals learn to optimize choices by adapting expectancies to the
probability of forthcoming outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). In repeated two-choice tasks, an increment in the prob-
ability of an optimal choice tends to follow the matching law
(Herrnstein, 2000). Speciﬁcally, a matching between choice and
reward probabilities is commonly observed, which is considered
to be a consequence of a default adaptive strategy (West and
Stanovich, 2003; Koehler and James, 2010). Nevertheless, sequen-
tial decision making tasks which include dependencies between
choices can produce higher learning variability, and can lead to
choices which deviate substantially from programmed reward
probabilities (Herbranson and Wang, 2014).
Optimal choice in these more complex scenarios can be seen
as arising from a Bayesian inference; that is, the probability of
the outcome can be computed by combining its prior proba-
bility and the likelihood of the new observation. Alternatively,
by repeating the decisional task, optimal choice preference can
also develop through learning of either the most often rewarded
ﬁnal choice (i.e., switch in the MHD), or of the speciﬁc sequence
of choices associated with the highest reward probability (e.g.,
“choose the leftmost option in the three-choice scenario, then
switch in the two-choice decision”). The latter seems to explain
pigeons’ tendency to choose more optimally than humans in anal-
ogous MHD tasks (Herbranson and Schroeder, 2010; but see
Mazur and Kahlbaugh, 2012 for similar results between species).
In the case of humans, is repeated practice really useful for
learning to choose optimally in the MHD? Furthermore, is this
learning useful for improving correct Bayesian reasoning?
Since the earlier observations of Granberg and Brown (1995),
several studies have shown an increase in switching rate after
several repetitions of the MHD (Friedman, 1998; Granberg and
Dorr, 1998; Franco-Watkins et al., 2003; Palacios-Huerta, 2003;
Herbranson and Schroeder, 2010; Petrocelli and Harris, 2011;
Mazur and Kahlbaugh, 2012; Klein et al., 2013; Saenen et al.,
2014). However, in the absence of highly rewarding outcomes
(Palacios-Huerta, 2003), a large majority of participants persist in
the sub-optimal sticking strategy, switching in none or in only a
few trials. As developed below, this impediment can be related to
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a switching aversion and/or to an endowment eﬀect (Kahneman
et al., 1991). These emotional inﬂuences work against the dis-
covery of the optimal choice by biasing the estimation of the
winning probability of the ﬁrst choice; that is, by inducing an
illusion of control (Gilovich et al., 1995; Granberg and Brown,
1995), by biasing the memory of previous choice-outcome events
(Petrocelli and Harris, 2011), and/or by preventing the accumu-
lation of enough switching-winning experiences, as shown by a
large number of participants in numerous studies.
Switch Aversion and the Endowment Effect
Similar to ﬁndings in other choice contexts (Landman, 1988),
studies focusing on the MHD show that people report stronger
regret when losing a prize by switching than by sticking (Gilovich
et al., 1995; Granberg and Brown, 1995). Interestingly, Petrocelli
and Harris (2011) observed that participants overestimated the
trials in which they switched and lost, supporting the subjec-
tive experience that switching and losing is more aversive than
sticking and losing. An increment of counterfactual thoughts asso-
ciated with regret after switching and losing seemed to explain
this distortion in memory (Petrocelli and Harris, 2011).
Not only do people ﬁnd switching and losing highly aver-
sive, they also appear to perceive switching and winning as less
rewarding than sticking and winning (Franco-Watkins et al.,
2003). In one of Franco-Watkins et al.’s (2003) experiments, par-
ticipants played several rounds of the MHD after observing the
choices and outcomes of a virtual participant in an analogous
version of the game. Results showed that the switching rate of
the participants was still below 50% even after observing that,
in a rigged condition, switching produced 90% of winning trials,
whereas the sticking rate was 100% after observing a player stick-
ing and winning 90% of the trials (Franco-Watkins et al., 2003).
Accordingly, the win-stay, lose-switch strategy shown in other
probability learning tasks (e.g., Nowak and Sigmund, 1993) seems
to be modulated by the previous choice (sticking or switching) in
the MHD.
The switch aversion, or its complementary endowment
eﬀect—the tendency to attribute higher value to own options,
even when compared to a slight more rewarding alternative
(Kahneman et al., 1991)—has also been observed in variations of
the MHD which include a larger number of doors (Stibel et al.,
2009). That is, the endowment eﬀect has been observed even in
conditions where the diﬀerence between the ﬁnal winning prob-
abilities is much higher than in the standard three doors scenario
(opening 8 of 9 remaining doors: Franco-Watkins et al., 2003;
or opening 98 of 99 remaining doors: Stibel et al., 2009). In the
mentioned experiment of Franco-Watkins et al. (2003), partic-
ipants still preferred sticking with the initial choice even after
observing the ﬁctitious participant staying and losing in 90% of
the trials (Franco-Watkins et al., 2003; 10C/3D condition). Stibel
et al. (2009; Experiments 1 and 4) also found that between 30 and
50% of participants preferred the ﬁrst choice after opening 98 of
99 remaining doors in one-shot game.
A marked tendency to stick with the ﬁrst choice has also been
observed in a condition in which the second choice was made
between the ﬁrst selection and both of the other two options, that
is, without the elimination event and, hence, without the need
to update probabilities (Morone and Fiore, 2008). As expected,
the percentage of participants switching was signiﬁcantly higher
(across 10 trials, the overall switch rate was.58; 8 of 20 of partici-
pants had a switch rate higher than.7) compared to the standard
MHD (the overall switch rate was.41; only 1 of 20 participants
had a switch rate higher than.7). However, the percentage of par-
ticipants with a switch rate below 0.5 was still not far away from
the standard MHD (40 and 50% in “for dummies” and stan-
dard versions, respectively; Morone and Fiore, 2008), suggesting
that switch aversion or the endowment eﬀect work as attractors
toward the non-optimal choice of sticking even in the MHD “for
dummies.”
Overcoming Choice Biases
Granberg and Dorr (1998), Tubau and Alonso (2003), and Stibel
et al. (2009) attempted to reduce the endowment eﬀect by elim-
inating the participants’ ﬁrst choice. This was accomplished by
assigning participants one option among the initial three so that
participants only had to choose between sticking and switch-
ing. Although the preference for switching was higher than in
standard MHD conditions, about 50% of the participants still
preferred the ﬁrst, assigned choice (Tubau and Alonso, 2003).
Furthermore, informal reports of the participants showed no
improvement in correct Bayesian reasoning, including those par-
ticipants who switched in most of the trials (Tubau and Alonso,
2003; see also Stibel et al., 2009). Typical comments of par-
ticipants who ﬁnally became aware of the switching advantage
believed that the computer programwas biased in favor of switch-
ing but they expected the same winning probability for both
choices (switching and sticking). It could be argued that such
conditions hampered the motivation of the participants and,
accordingly, their attention to the relevant contingencies was
diminished. As observed in other tasks, being able to choose
seems to be crucial to engage motivation (Leotti et al., 2010). But
in the case of the MHD we have seen that the attraction to the
ﬁrst choice often prevents exploring the consequences of switch-
ing, making the discovery of the causes producing the switching
advantage even more diﬃcult.
On the other hand, it is well known that the perception of two
remaining options in the ﬁnal choice induces the misapplication
of the equiprobability principle (Johnson-Laird et al., 1999; Falk
and Lann, 2008). Hence, discovering the optimal choice in the
MHD can be enhanced by changing the visual appearance of the
ﬁnal choice scenario or by manipulating the number of initial
choices. For example, Howard et al. (2007) found higher switch-
ing rates in a condition in which all the boxes (closed and open)
were visible compared to a condition in which the null options
were removed. Increasing the area of the closed boxes also had
a signiﬁcant eﬀect, although smaller than the number-of-boxes
manipulation. Hence, the number of visible options seemed to
be a relevant factor for promoting switching choices. Evidence
of reasoning improvement was not reported but, based on other
studies, it seems unlikely that the number-of-boxes manipula-
tion had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on correct reasoning. In a one-shot
scenario, Stibel et al. (2009) showed that, among the partici-
pants choosing to switch, probability judgments matched the
equiprobability intuition, even in the condition in which 98 of the
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remaining 99 options were removed! (see also Franco-Watkins
et al., 2003).
In addition to the interventions introduced above, increasing
incentives (Friedman, 1998; Palacios-Huerta, 2003), or enhancing
collaborative playing (Palacios-Huerta, 2003) also seem to be
eﬀective for overcoming choice biases in the MHD, at least
for some participants. It is worth noting that the most eﬀec-
tive intervention appears to be the manipulation of incentives
(Palacios-Huerta, 2003), supporting the emotional source of the
choice biases observed in the MHD. Unfortunately, none of these
latter studies reported probabilistic judgments of the participants.
However, based on the results of Stibel et al. (2009), who also
used money as a reward, an increment in the amount of gain
does not seem to be eﬀective for improving Bayesian reason-
ing. In the next section we review in more detail the relationship
between choice and reasoning improvement in the MHD, as well
as possible explanations for the observed dissociation.
Dissociating Choice from Reasoning
None of the MHD studies assessing the accuracy of probabilistic
judgments after several repetitions have observed improvement
of correct explicit Bayesian reasoning (Franco-Watkins et al.,
2003; Klein et al., 2013; Saenen et al., 2014). In the best case, par-
ticipants who, following practice, report that switching is more
advantageous, tend to switch more often (Tubau and Alonso,
2003), but they are typically unable to explain the reason for that
advantage (see also Klein et al., 2013).
It could be argued that the null eﬀect of practice for enhancing
understanding the probabilistic structure of the MHD is due to
the small amount of practice (commonly less than 50 repetitions).
Nevertheless, a larger number of trials appear insuﬃcient for
maximizing optimal choice (Herbranson and Schroeder, 2010;
Klein et al., 2013; Saenen et al., 2014) or for enhancing correct
Bayesian reasoning (Klein et al., 2013; Saenen et al., 2014). For
example, after about 250 repetitions of the MHD, only one partic-
ipant out of 17 seemed to correctly explain the optimal strategy:
“First, I clicked on a random box. After one of the boxes disap-
peared, I clicked on the third box” (Klein et al., 2013), but even
this was without clear evidence of having understood the cause of
the switching advantage. Saenen et al. (2014) analyzed the accu-
racy of probability judgments in diﬀerent moments during 100
repetitions of the MHD and found no evidence of improvement
at any stage of practice. It is worth noting that Saenen et al. (2014)
gave continuous feedback and, in one of the groups, feedback
explicitly related winning and losing to each choice (sticking and
switching). Although explicit feedback increased frequency of
switching, it was not helpful for improving explicit probabilistic
judgments.
Accordingly, studies centered on the eﬀect of practice with
the MHD suggest that knowledge acquired by learning the diﬀer-
ent winning probabilities does not lead to better comprehension
of the MHD. More speciﬁcally, practice seems to facilitate the
overcoming of initial choice biases, but does not facilitate an
understanding of why initial choice tendencies are not optimal.
Supporting this claim, signiﬁcant increments in optimal choice
in the MHD have been observed even without explicitly noticing
its advantage, although the general tendency to choose optimally
(switch) is much weaker than when noticing the switching advan-
tage (Tubau and Alonso, 2003; Klein et al., 2013). In addition
to the initial strong bias to avoid switching, these results suggest
the involvement of associative mechanisms similar to the ones
reported in studies with other non-human animals (Herbranson
and Schroeder, 2010; Mazur and Kahlbaugh, 2012; Klein et al.,
2013). Associative mechanisms can explain the observed implicit
learning of the switching advantage. Nevertheless, without aware-
ness of the rules and eﬀortful control to apply them, they
seem to be insuﬃcient to overcome initial choice biases (see
Stocco and Fum, 2008, for similar conclusion in other choice
tasks).
In line with the associative account introduced to explain
the observed dissociation between reasoning and choice, Stibel
et al. (2009) concluded that evidential strength, on which choices
are based, is sensitive to the evidence provided by alternative
hypotheses, but explicit probability judgments are typically less
sensitive to slight or apparent changes in support strength (see
also Tversky and Koehler, 1994). Accordingly, variables aﬀecting
the increment of optimal choice, as for example the increment
in the number of non-chosen options, produce an increment in
evidence strength for the alternative hypothesis (switch in the
MHD) without aﬀecting the corresponding probabilistic judg-
ment (Stibel et al., 2009). Similarly, the eﬀect of repeated practice
with the MHD enhances the realization that the proportion of
winnings by switching is higher than winnings by sticking, which
aﬀects the evidence strength of the ﬁnal choices. Nevertheless,
all these interventions remain insuﬃcient for overcoming the
equiprobability illusion, which continues to bias explicit proba-
bilistic judgments.
Enhancing Probabilistic Reasoning in
the MHD
Based on the reviewed evidence, repeated practice and/or higher
incentives have a moderate eﬀect on increasing the probabil-
ity to choose optimally, but it is not useful for enhancing the
understanding of the causes of the switching advantage, namely,
the prior, conditional, and posterior probabilities involved in
the MHD. This section reviews the utility of interventions more
directly aimed at improving explicit Bayesian reasoning.
Explaining Possibilities: Mental Models and
the Perspective Effect
The information presented in the text of the problem aﬀects the
building of the mental models on which judgments and decisions
are based (Legrenzi et al., 1993; Johnson-Laird et al., 1999). In
the case of the MHD, diﬀerent manipulations have been shown
to aﬀect reasoning and/or choice. As previously introduced, if
instead of the standard dilemma, participants are oﬀered a choice
between the selected door and both of the remaining two doors
(“for dummies” version inMorone and Fiore, 2008), the tendency
to switch increases. It is well documented that decision makers
create mental models based on the number of options being pre-
sented (Johnson-Laird et al., 1999). If one of the three options is
removed, only two models are taken into account: One in which
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the prize is behind the selected door, and one in which the prize
is behind the remaining door (see also Johnson-Laird et al., 1999;
Franco-Watkins et al., 2003). Nevertheless, presenting a more
transparent MHD does not imply developing a more complete
representation, as many individuals have trouble understanding
the prior probabilities (Tubau and Alonso, 2003; Tubau, 2008; see
below).
The interventions which have been demonstrated to be the
most eﬀective for improving correct reasoning in the MHD
explicitly request the reasoner to imagine the diﬀerent possibili-
ties from the diﬀerent perspectives of both the contestant and the
host (Krauss and Wang, 2003; Tubau and Alonso, 2003; Tubau,
2008). For example, using a diagram, Krauss and Wang (2003)
presented three closed doors, one representing the selection of a
hypothetical contestant. To enhance the representation of the dif-
ferent possibilities from each perspective, participants were asked
to imagine being the host of the game who is opening a null door
between the two non-selected doors. The percentage of correct
justiﬁcations of the switching advantage, from the contestant’s
point of view, increased from 3% in the standard MHD to 39%
in this new presentation (50% correctly noticed the advantage of
switching; Krauss and Wang, 2003). Given that participants did
not perform the initial choice, it could be argued that the beneﬁt
of the intervention was in part a consequence of eliminating the
diﬃculty in overcoming initial choice biases (see Switch Aversion
and the Endowment Eﬀect). However, the eﬀectiveness of the
perspective manipulation was also observed in an experienced
adversary game context, regardless of the role of the participant
(Tubau and Alonso, 2003).
More directly, Tubau and Alonso (2003) asked participants
to represent the diﬀerent possibilities from both perspectives.
In their third experiment, participants were presented an imag-
inary card game between two adversaries: The decision maker
selecting a card among three (one ace and two other cards),
and the informant keeping the other two. Analogous to the
host of the MHD, the informant always showed a non-ace card
after the decision-maker’s selection. In one experimental con-
dition, participants had to state the possibilities of each player
having the ace, and then estimate each player’s likelihood of win-
ning, as well as provide a justiﬁcation for the perceived best
strategy (switching, sticking, or no preference). This condition
was compared to the same adversary version, but without the
requirement of representing the possibilities, as well as to the
standard MHD. Percentage of correct justiﬁcations for the switch
response were 0% in the standard MHD, 25% in the adver-
sary version without explicit representation, and 60% in the
adversary version with explicit representation of possibilities. In
sum, encouraging a shift between perspectives seems to be an
eﬀective intervention to enhance the building of more complete
mental models of the diﬀerent possible locations of the prize,
as well as improved awareness of which options can be elim-
inated and why. Support for this proposal can also be found
in Tor and Bazerman (2003) who, based on protocol analyses
in diﬀerent competitive games, concluded that the main dif-
ﬁculty in competitive contexts is to consider the decisions of
others and the rules of the game (the constraints of the host
in the MHD).
Enhancing Correct Probabilistic Judgments:
The Role of Natural Frequencies
Another widely discussed facilitator of Bayesian reasoning per-
formance is to present and request problem information as
natural frequencies (Gigerenzer and Hoﬀrage, 1995; Girotto and
Gonzalez, 2001; Johnson and Tubau, 2013). Although disagree-
ment persists regarding the speciﬁc mechanisms involved in
processing natural frequencies (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1994; Barbey
and Sloman, 2007), presenting and requesting information in a
similar frequency format is also known to facilitate reasoning in
the MHD.
For example, Krauss and Wang (2003; Experiment 3) com-
pared the utility of an intervention based on a simpliﬁed rep-
resentation of only three arrangements (similar to ﬁrst three
possibilities in Table 1) with a more complete representation of
six arrangements (mental model representation from Johnson-
Laird et al., 1999; similar to the diagram shown in Figure 2,
but including the complete representation of each possibility
instead of the frequency information). Results showed that the
three-arrangements version promoted more correct responses.
The beneﬁt of the simpliﬁed representation was interpreted as
a consequence of its higher resemblance to a natural frequency
format (Krauss and Wang, 2003). However, it is not clear which
words and numbers were included in the question requiring
the probability judgment. As shown in other Bayesian prob-
lems, the match between the text of the problem and the text
of the question has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the responses (Girotto
and Gonzalez, 2001; Ayal and Beyth-Marom, 2014). If the ques-
tion was the same as in Kraus and Wang’s Experiment 2, then
there would be a better match between the question (___ out of
3) and the simpliﬁed representation (three arrangements) than
between the question and the complete version (six models). So,
it could be the case that the more complete representation was
FIGURE 2 | Card shown by the informant (analogous to the host in the
MHD) in six hypothetical repetitions of the game. Notice that among the
three times that the informant shows the 7 (or the 8) he hides the ACE twice
(adapted from Tubau, 2008).
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less eﬀective due to the additional steps needed to transform
presented information into the form requested in the question.
Related to the previous hypothesis, in Tubau (2008;
Experiments 1A,B) two explanations of an analogous MHD
card game were compared: In the concrete frequency version,
the explanation referred to a speciﬁc simulation of six games,
analogous to the mental models representation (i.e., in the two
cases in which John has the ace and the 7, he will show the 7; in
the two cases in which John has the ace and the 8, he will show
the 8; and in the two cases in which John has the 7 and the 8, he
will show the 7 once and the 8 once; see Figure 2). In the relative
frequency version, less precise verbal quantiﬁers were used (i.e.,
if John has the ace and the 7, he will always show the 7; if John
has the ace and the 8, he will always show the 8, and if he has
the 7 and the 8 he will show the 7 half of the times and the 8 half
of the times). Each version was presented with and without a
diagram similar to the one presented in Figure 2. Results showed
a signiﬁcant eﬀect of statistical format (concrete frequencies
enhanced performance compared to abstract quantiﬁers), but no
eﬀect was found for the visual diagram. Hence, results supported
the Krauss and Wang (2003) and Tubau and Alonso (2003)
conclusion regarding the need to build models (possibilities)
from both perspectives in a way which facilitates the computation
of the respective winning frequencies. As shown in these studies,
the highest beneﬁt is observed when participants are externally
guided during both the presentation of the problem and via the
formulation of the question. Furthermore, and similarly to other
Bayesian reasoning problems, the closer the match between
the numerical format included in the explanation and the
required numerical expression, the higher the beneﬁt (Girotto
and Gonzalez, 2001; Ayal and Beyth-Marom, 2014).
Explaining Causal Relations: Competition
Scenarios
According to the studies reviewed so far, probabilistic reasoning
in the MHD can be improved through interventions that facil-
itate building a more complete representation of the diﬀerent
possibilities, or by prompting the required numerical expres-
sion in the format of the requested probabilistic judgment (i.e.,
___ out of 3). Nevertheless, the extent to which any corre-
sponding improvement indicates a complete understanding of
both prior probabilities and the consequences of the elimina-
tion’s conditions, (as opposed to simply being a consequence of
a match between representations), remains unclear. As devel-
oped in Section “Understanding the MHD: From Intuition to
Bayesian Reasoning,” understanding the MHD implies under-
standing that, after the elimination of an option conditioned to
the location of the prize, the winning probability of the ﬁrst
choice remains invariant, whereas the winning probability of the
remaining option increases twofold.
Related to the comprehension of the elimination’s constraints,
a diﬀerent and interesting approach to improve reasoning in
the MHD was developed by Burns and Wieth (2004). Similarly
to Glymour (2001), Burns and Wieth (2004) attributed the
main cause of failed understanding of the MHD to a failure in
understanding the causal structure which produces the switch-
ing advantage (see also Krynski and Tenenbaum, 2007, in other
Bayesian scenarios). From this perspective, the fact that two inde-
pendent causes (initial choice and location of the prize) collide on
a common eﬀect (the opening of one of the non-selected doors;
see Table 1) might explain why the MHD is so hard. Based on this
assumption, Burns andWieth (2004) hypothesized that a context
more clearly presenting the causes that determine the elimi-
nation of an option would enhance reasoning. Supporting this
hypothesis, Burns and Wieth (2004) found better performance
in analogous MHD competition scenarios (i.e., a competition
among three boxers in which only one was the best). However,
even in the best conditions of the competition context, only about
50% of the participants selected the optimal (switch) choice and
less than 20% of participants were able to express the correct pos-
terior winning probabilities. These results suggest that making
more salient the causal conditions that determine the elimina-
tion event, or a better knowledge of the rules of the game (Tor
and Bazerman, 2003), are also insuﬃcient for a large number of
participants to understand the MHD. It is worth noting that clear
causal structures seem to primarily beneﬁt higher numerate rea-
soners in other Bayesian problems (McNair and Feeney, 2014).
In the case of the MHD, in addition to the just reviewed diﬃ-
culties, we suggest that this limitation is also due to a failure in
representing the prior probabilities.
An Overlooked Failure: Incomplete
Representation of Prior Probabilities
How people represent the prior probabilities in the MHD has
been rarely investigated. In most studies it is assumed that
people have an accurate representation of the diﬀerent proba-
bilities before the elimination event that is, before inducing the
equiprobability illusion. However, with the exception of the prior
winning probability for the ﬁrst choice, prior probabilities in
the MHD are not necessarily obvious. Representing the winning
probability of the initial choice is easy given the transparent cor-
respondence between the initial information, three doors, and
one prize, and the correct ratio 1 of 3 chances to win. However,
representing the winning probability of the set including the two
remaining doors might present a conﬂict between these two non-
selected doors and the three initial doors. In fact, it has been
observed that only about 50% of undergraduates understand that
the chance of the non-selected options (held by the host or infor-
mant in the card game) hiding the ace is 2 of 3, with a common
response instead being 1 of 2 (Tubau and Alonso, 2003; Tubau,
2008). Still more diﬃcult is understanding (or expressing) that,
among the non-selected options, at least one is null. Only 25%
of participants were able to correctly answer the question: “What
is the probability that, among the non-selected cards, at least one
is not the ace?” (Tubau, 2008). Hence, although most participants
are able to represent, in a diagram, the diﬀerent possible locations
of the prize (Tubau and Alonso, 2003), many have diﬃculties
expressing the corresponding probabilities (Tubau and Alonso,
2003; Tubau, 2008).
Weak representation of uncertain information causes vulner-
ability to biases and/or to conservative behavior (van der Pligt,
1998). Similarly, we argue that one of the consequences of the
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incomplete comprehension of prior probabilities in the MHD is
the vulnerability to the equiprobability illusion. This, together
with the choice biases discussed above, promotes the ﬁnal deci-
sion to stick. In particular, susceptibility to the illusion is caused
by a weak representation of the facts that: (a) the non-selected
doors will hide the prize 2 out of 3 times, (b) among the non-
selected doors it is certain that at least one is null, and (c) this
null option will always be eliminated. Furthermore, without an
adequate representation of the prior probabilities, the perspective
manipulation commented above has no eﬀect (e.g., in the adver-
sary version without the explicit representation manipulation in
Tubau and Alonso, 2003). Accordingly, being able to understand
the elimination’s conditions (the constraints imposed on the host
or on the computer), which is crucial for correct Bayesian rea-
soning in the MHD (Krauss and Wang, 2003; Burns and Wieth,
2004), cannot be useful without an accurate representation of
the prior probabilities. It is worth noting that the most eﬀective
intervention in Krauss and Wang (2003) was the one prompt-
ing reasoners to imagine themselves opening one of the doors
according to the elimination’s conditions (perspective eﬀect),
together with the requirement to express the answer as a ratio
of frequencies: The number of times, out of 3, in which the prize
would be behind the contestant’s door. That is, the one promoting
the representation of the initial possible locations of the prize.
In sum, a large number of the undergraduates that partici-
pate in the MHD experiments do not have adequate knowledge
to understand and/or represent prior and conditional probabili-
ties in the MHD (Tubau and Alonso, 2003; Tubau, 2008; see also
Brase et al., 2006, for similar claim in the context of other prob-
abilistic reasoning tasks). Therefore, when interpreting the data
in the literature, it is important to take into account these limita-
tions. A more complete comprehension of the psychology of the
MHD would require the consideration of speciﬁc knowledge or
skills as mediators of performance.
Understanding Reasoning Failures in
the MHD: A Theoretical Analyses
Although not without critics (for a recent review see Evans and
Stanovich, 2013), most current thinking theories share a dual-
systems or dual-processing approach. In essence, dual think-
ing theories consider that eﬀortless, intuitive thinking processes
occasionally lead to erroneous or suboptimal responses, unless
more eﬀortful, analytical reasoning processes intervene to over-
ride an initially biased tendency (Evans, 2010; Kahneman, 2011;
Stanovich, 2011). Some of the factors that determine the success
of eﬀortful reasoning include: Adequate cognitive resources, spe-
ciﬁc knowledge related to the task, conﬁdence in the intuitive
response, and thinking dispositions (engagement or laziness of
the reﬂectivemind). Speciﬁcally, Stanovich (2009) suggested that
the reasoning system can be understood as including two dif-
ferent “minds”: the algorithmic, which controls the running of
speciﬁc reasoning procedures, and the reﬂective, which decides
which reasoning algorithm to apply and/or whether or not to
invest more eﬀort into the task. Therefore, according to this
proposal, overriding an erroneous response produced by the
autonomous mind (Stanovich, 2009) might fail due to lack of
resources and/or knowledge to run speciﬁc procedures (a fail-
ure of the algorithmic mind) and/or due to weak disposition to
implement a needed procedure or to review an initial response (a
failure of the reﬂective mind).
Applying this distinction to the MHD, would the frequent
but wrong application of the equiprobability principle be a fail-
ure of the algorithmic mind? Or would it be consequence of a
lazy reﬂective mind? As commented in Section “An Overlooked
Failure: Incomplete Representation of Prior Probabilities,” a large
number of participants do not have adequate knowledge to
correctly represent the prior and conditional probabilities in
the MHD (e.g., the probability of the set of non-chosen doors
containing the ace; the probability of one of the non-chosen
doors being empty; Tubau and Alonso, 2003; Tubau, 2008). For
these participants, explicit explanations of the diﬀerent possibil-
ities during the game had a weak eﬀect on correct reasoning,
compared to that observed with higher numerate participants
(Tubau, 2008). In addition to a lack of speciﬁc knowledge, rea-
soning in the MHD has been also impaired when the reasoning
resources (working memory) were compromised by a secondary
task (De Neys and Verschueren, 2006), supporting the relevance
of the algorithmic mind for correct reasoning. Nevertheless, it
is a common ﬁnding that the MHD remains obscure even for
high numerate individuals (Girotto and Gonzalez, 2005) or for
participants with high working memory span (De Neys and
Verschueren, 2006).
Regarding the role of the reﬂective mind in the MHD, there
is no direct evidence of a relation between reﬂective thinking
ability and performance in the MHD. Based on the general
ﬁnding of strong diﬃculties in overcoming the equiprobabil-
ity bias, even for individuals with more education (Girotto and
Gonzalez, 2005) or higher working memory span (De Neys
and Verschueren, 2006), we anticipate that the relation between
reﬂective thinking capacity and correct reasoning in the MHD
would be small or non-existent. It is possible that this relation
might emerge if additional relevant information were provided
(e.g., explicit representation of the diﬀerent possibilities), as
observed for participants higher in numeracy (Tubau, 2008). But,
without this facilitation, weakness of the reﬂective mind on its
own is unlikely to be the main cause of reasoning failures in the
MHD.
If people high in cognitive reﬂection fail to review the erro-
neous default intuition it may be due to either an absence of the
relevant triggering conditions for reﬂection, or to the absence of
adequate knowledge to replace the erroneous default intuition
with the correct model of the task (due, for example, to a biased
representation of prior probabilities; see Section “An Overlooked
Failure: Incomplete Representation of Prior Probabilities”). One
of the relevant triggering conditions for reﬂection is the detec-
tion of conﬂicting beliefs, which tends to reduce conﬁdence in the
correctness of the response (Thompson, 2009; De Neys, 2014).
In the case of the MHD, experience with the game can produce
two diﬀerent types of conﬂict: (1) Conﬂict between correct repre-
sentation of prior probabilities and the elimination’s conditions
and the subsequent equiprobability intuition, and (2) Conﬂict
between the default equiprobable intuition and the experienced
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switching advantage. None of the reviewed studies have reported
conﬁdence measures or other measures of conﬂict detection.
Nevertheless, based on previous ﬁndings showing incomplete
prior representation and/or the formation of the wrong belief
that, after the elimination of an option, a probability update is
needed (Baratgin and Politzer, 2010), we anticipate that no con-
ﬂict (1) would be detected, however, this would be an interesting
question to follow up in future studies.
Related to previous conﬂict (2), there is evidence that noticing
it does not improve the chances to override the default intu-
ition (Tubau and Alonso, 2003; Klein et al., 2013; Saenen et al.,
2014). For example, in Tubau and Alonso (2003), participants
who noticed the conﬂict between the equiprobability intuition
and the switching advantage seemed to solve this contradic-
tion by creating a new explanation (in terms on an anomaly
in the computer program). That is, the equiprobability intu-
ition seemed to be accompanied by such a strong feeling of
rightness (e.g., Thompson, 2009) that the observation of a dis-
crepancy would have been associated with exception (anomalous
program) rather than to a conﬂict to be solved. Furthermore, if
some form of conﬂict were detected, the biased representation
of the underlying probabilistic structure for most participants
(see An Overlooked Failure: Incomplete Representation of Prior
Probabilities), together with the direct perception of two ﬁnal, ini-
tially equal, doors would have likely prevented ﬁnding the correct
solution. In this sense, reasoning failures in the MHD could be
attributed to automatic processes which build a particularly vivid
default mental model of the task, and correspondingly strong
justiﬁcation of its correctness, rather than to a weakness of the
reﬂective mind per se.
Implications for Enhancing Bayesian
Reasoning
As commented above, participants noticing the switching advan-
tage in the repeated MHD solved the contradiction with the
default intuition by building an alternative explanation able to
preserve it. This suggests that the reﬂective mind might indeed
notice certain conﬂicting information (conﬂict 2 in previous sec-
tion), but the relevant information needed to correct the error
in the default intuition (i.e., correct representation of prior prob-
abilities and the elimination’s conditions) is either not available
or ignored. Accordingly, the eﬃcacy of interventions aimed at
improving Bayesian reasoning in the MHD would depend on
the available reasoner skills and/or external hints which enhance
the building of a more complete representation of the task.
According to the present review, the interventions that have
been shown to be the most eﬀective are the ones promot-
ing a diﬀerent partition of the probability space (Krauss and
Wang, 2003; Tubau and Alonso, 2003; Tubau, 2008). Instead of
modeling the winning probability of each of the three options
separately [P(each option) = 1/3], understanding the MHD
requires modeling the winning probability of each set of pos-
sibilities corresponding to each actor [i.e., P(contestant) = 1/3;
P(host)= 2/3]. Notice that with this representation, and with the
additional knowledge that the host for sure has at least one null
TABLE 2 | Main beliefs and biases affecting reasoning and choice in the
MHD both before and after the elimination of an option.
Incorrect reasoning and choice
Before the elimination of an option
Correct application of the equiprobability principle: Three equal
options (frequently, together with incorrect or incomplete
representation of the possibilities related to the set including the other
two options)
After the elimination of a null option
Reasoning based on cognitive biases (incorrect comprehension of
priors and/or the elimination’s conditions; incorrect application of the
equiprobability principle): Chances are equal for switch and stick
(1/2 each)
Choice based on emotional biases (switch aversion; endowment
effect; illusion of control): Select stick (consider switching in case of
bizarre or unexplainable observation of switch advantage)
Correct reasoning and choice
Before the elimination of an option
Correct partition of the probability space: Two unequal sets of
possibilities
Chances for the selected option: 1/3
Chances for the other two options: 2/3 (and a null option for sure)
After the obligatory elimination of a null option
Correct comprehension of the elimination’s conditions
Chances for the selected option: 1/3
Chances for the other option: 2/3 (the null option was predicted)
Reasoning: Chances are higher for switch (2/3) than for
stick (1/3)
Choice: Switch is a better option than stick
option that must be shown, no other computation is needed (see
Table 2).
In sum, as observed in other Bayesian problems, the correct
partition of the problem space of probabilities or corre-
sponding set–subset structure is crucial for correct reasoning
(Johnson-Laird et al., 1999; Barbey and Sloman, 2007). As also
shown in other Bayesian problems, the use of natural frequen-
cies can facilitate the comprehension of the MHD (Krauss and
Wang, 2003; Tubau and Alonso, 2003; Tubau, 2008). This seems
particularly relevant in case of lower numerate reasoners, who
would require a simulation of the partitioned probabilities by
simulating several repetitions of the game (Tubau, 2008). But,
in general, reviewed ﬁndings in the MHD suggest that the accu-
racy of explicit Bayesian reasoning depends on the accuracy of
the underlying partitions of the probability space included in the
mental model of the task.
Conclusion
The strong counterintuitivity of the MHD has intrigued people
for decades. What is it about the MHD that makes it so hard
for people to know that switching is the best course of action
to win the prize? And on top of that, what is it that generates
such strong disbelief even if it is realized that switching is bet-
ter? Assuming the random assignation of the prize, it is clear
that, in the initial stage of the game, most people would correctly
assign to each alternative the same probability of hiding the
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prize. It is after the ﬁrst choice is already made and the second
choice to stick or switch is oﬀered that the dilemma develops.
The trouble starts with the initially built representation of the
task upon which this second decision is based. On the one hand,
emotional biases such as anticipation of regret and the endow-
ment eﬀect make people opt for sticking. On the other hand, it
has also been suggested that the incomplete representation of the
diﬀerent possible courses of action is normally mediated by igno-
rance about the constraints involved in the elimination of one
option. Nevertheless, as argued in this review, the initial partition
between three equally likely options instead of two unequal sets of
possibilities (contestant’s and host’s possibilities) seems also to be
an important determinant, frequently ignored, for the diﬃculty
in overcoming the equiprobability illusion in the ﬁnal two-choice
scenario.
The relevance of ensuring a correct initial partition of the
probability space, combined with understanding that there is a
null option within the non-selected partition, is supported by
the observation that the best interventions shown to improve
Bayesian reasoning in the MHD are the ones promoting the rep-
resentation of the possibilities of each actor (contestant and host).
Furthermore, the dissociation observed between the interven-
tions enhancing optimal choice (repeated practice or increased
incentives) and the ones enhancing correct reasoning (explicit
partitioning of possibilities) is coherent with current dual process
theories of thinking (e.g., Sloman, 1996; Evans, 2010; Kahneman,
2011; Stanovich, 2011) and with dual process models of reward
learning (Dayan and Daw, 2008). Whereas changes in preference
would be controlled by the autonomous mind (i.e., by means
of model-free reward learning mechanisms), explicit reason-
ing would depend on available cognitive resources and explicit
knowledge of the task (similarly to the requirements of model-
based reward mechanisms). Accordingly, the present review
highlights promising new avenues to help understand behav-
ior and reasoning gaps, and to anticipate the eﬃcacy of new
interventions to improve Bayesian reasoning.
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